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1 Introduction
The quantum and classical worldviews differ profoundly in two ways, both
of which bear on the nature of observation. Briefly, if A and B are quantum
systems whose states are represented in Hilbert spaces A and B then the states
of the composite system AB are represented in the tensor product A⊗B. Only
if the state of AB is a pure product state can A and B be truly regarded as
separate entities. If A and B interact then in general a pure product state will
evolve to a mixed state. This is in sharp contrast to the classical worldview,
according to which A and B always have definite states, whether they interact
or not.
This entanglement of interacting systems becomes particularly interesting
when the interaction has the nature of observation, and it is closely related to
the other great novelty of the quantum theory, viz., the apparent stochastic
nature of measurement in the quantum theory. We say ‘apparent’ because the
conclusion that quantum observation is nondeterministic follows from the in-
sistence that an observed system S and an observer O are in definite states
following an observation.
Suppose S and O are represented in Hilbert spaces U and W. Suppose for
convenience that the measurement in question corresponds to a selfadjoint
operator A on U with a discrete spectrum {λi}. Let Ui be the λi-eigenspace
of A, and let Pi be the orthogonal projection (OP) to Ui. Then {Ui} is an
orthogonal decomposition of U, and {Pi} is an orthogonal decomposition of
the identity. In order that the interaction of S and O qualify as a measurement
of A, final states of O corresponding to distinct eigenvalues of A must be
distinguishable with certainty, i.e., they must be mutually orthogonal. Let
Wi be the subspace of W corresponding to the value λi. Suppose θ ∈ U and
ϕ ∈ W are unit vectors. A measurement interaction is defined as one in which
an initial state θ ⊗ ϕ evolves to a state
∑
i
Piθ ⊗ ϕi =
∑
i
θi ⊗ ϕi, (1)
where, for each i, ϕi is a unit vector in Wi, and we have defined θi = Piθ for
notational convenience.
The Copenhagen interpretation states that if O is an observer in some sense,
e.g., if O is a person reading an experimental apparatus, then the final state
of SO is not the sum (1) but is actually one of the pure product states θi⊗ϕi,
and the probability that it is θi ⊗ ϕi is ‖θi ⊗ ϕi‖2 = ‖θi‖2. In this way the
Copenhagen interpretation accounts for our subjective experience that when
we perform a measurement as above we obtain a definite value; and it also
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accounts for our empirical observation that if the measurement is repeated
many times, the frequency with which each value λi is observed is close to
‖θi‖2. Note that the interpretation of ‖θi‖2 as a probability is “written into”
the Copenhagen interpretation, which is to say, it is taken as an axiom of the
quantum theory. Following Farhi et al [4], we refer to this as the probability
postulate.
The alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation is to take (1) at face value, as
the actual final state of SO. This is really no interpretation at all—being just
a restatement with emphasis of the basic principles of the quantum theory
of interacting systems—and hardly deserves a name, but its metaphysical
implications are felt by some to be so counterintuitive that it must be—if not
rejected outright—at least subjected to critical examination, for which purpose
it has been given the evocative name of the many-worlds interpretation.
The Copenhagen interpretation is useful in that it allows one to “get on”
with the business of physics insofar as this is understood to mean making
and confirming theoretical predictions of the results of experiments. As a de-
scription of reality, however, it is defective, principally in that there is no
objective criterion to decide when an interaction of physical systems proceeds
according to the ordinary laws of quantum physics and when it undergoes the
so-called wave-packet collapse described above. A vivid version of this conun-
drum is Schro¨dinger’s cat, who is either dead or alive inside a box depending
on whether a radioactive nucleus has decayed, the question being whether the
animal is really either one or the other before some higher form of life (read:
the scientist performing this callous experiment) opens the box to observe the
result.
The manifest impossibility of defining which interactions are observations in
the Copenhagen sense (quite apart from the evident impossibility of saying
anything intelligible about the actual process of wave-packet collapse) would
appear to rule out the Copenhagen interpretation as a model of reality. On
the other hand, the principal (indeed, upon close analysis the only) objection
to the many-worlds “interpretation” seems to be: “I don’t know about you,
but I ’m certainly in a definite state”. This sense that the many-worlds inter-
pretation of (1) is incompatible with experience appears ill founded on closer
examination, however, inasmuch as any question posed of SO—in the form of
a selfadjoint operator to be measured—that has the answer ‘yes’ with certainty
for each θi ⊗ ϕi, has the answer ‘yes’ with certainty for ∑i θi ⊗ ϕi, and vice
versa. (If we let ‘yes’ correspond to the eigenvalue 1, then such an operator is
the identity.) In other words, one cannot effectively ask the question: ‘Is the
world in a pure product state or in a superposition of such states?’.
As far as the analysis of a single measurement is concerned, the many-worlds
interpretation thus has no disadvantage, and since it has the advantage of
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internal consistency it would seem to be the interpretation of choice. Note,
however, that in the many-worlds view ‖θi‖2 is merely the weight of θi ⊗ ϕi
in
∑
i θi ⊗ ϕi, rather than the probability of θi ⊗ ϕi, as in the Copenhagen in-
terpretation. Indeed, the many-worlds interpretation of a single measurement
makes no statement at all regarding probability.
The interpretation of ‖θi‖2 as a probability is of course based on the fact
that in a series of repetitions of this measurement the cumulative frequency
of outcome λi approaches ‖θi‖2. This raises the following intriguing issue. In
the many-worlds interpretation all possible outcomes of a measurement oper-
ation are represented, and in the case of repeated measurements, all possible
sequences of outcomes are represented. Does this not imply the certainty that
whenever we carry out an experiment of this sort there are versions of us who
witness sequences of outcomes wildly at variance with theoretical predictions?
And are these versions not therefore led to reject the quantum theory solely
because of bad luck? The answer of course is ‘yes’, just as in the Copen-
hagen interpretation the possibility is always present that relative frequencies
of outcomes in a series of measurements will deviate significantly from theo-
retical prediction. Note that in the Copenhagen interpretation this is only a
possibility, while in the many-worlds interpretation it is a certainty. The prob-
ability is small in the Copenhagen interpretation, just as the magnitude of
the corresponding component is small in the many-worlds interpretation. The
difference is that while we have learned to feel comfortable ignoring possible
outcomes that have small probability (indeed, our sanity depends on it), we
do not have a rationale for ignoring components with small magnitudes—we
cannot say that we are unlikely to have the corresponding experience, because
some version of us certainly does have that experience.
Our instinct when confronted with what we suspect to be a statistical deviation
is to prolong the series of measurements until the observed frequencies come
back into line. In the Copenhagen interpretation, by the strong law of large
numbers, this happens with probability 1. Precisely, in an infinite series of
measurements, the probability that the frequency statistic will not tend to its
proper limit is 0. It is natural to ask whether this scenario may be modeled in
the many-worlds interpretation and whether the component corresponding to
improper limiting behavior of the frequency statistic may be shown to vanish.
In fact, this would appear to be the essential question, a positive answer to
which nullifies any remaining objection to the many-worlds view.
Everett[3] discussed the interpretation of ‖θi‖2 as a probability in the many-
worlds interpretation, and Hartle[7] and Graham[5] applied the weak law of
large numbers to the frequency statistic in the context of finitely many obser-
vations; but to actually derive the probability interpretation of the squared
norm from prior principles one must apply the strong law of large numbers to
infinite sequences of observables.
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The simplest generalization of (1) to N independent measurements involves
the tensor product of N + 1 statevector spaces, and the corresponding gen-
eralization to infinitely many measurements involves the tensor product of
infinitely many Hilbert spaces. As shown by von Neumann [9], such a product
can be defined as a complex inner product space, but it is not separable—i.e.,
it has an uncountable set of pairwise orthonormal vectors. It thus lies outside
the standard framework of the quantum theory.
An analysis of the many-worlds interpretation for infinite sequences of observa-
tions in terms the von Neumann product was carried out by Farhi, Goldstone,
and Gutmann[4] (see also [6]). Unaware of the von Neumann construction, and
a fortiori unaware of the work of Farhi et al., the present author conceived and
derived this result in the context of ordinary (separable) Hilbert space. Here
(perceived) necessity was indeed the mother of invention, as the construction
employed in this proof was the inspiration and starting point for the con-
struction of the hidden-variables models presented in [8]—in which, as in the
many-worlds setting, the apparent stochastic nature of observation is inherent
in the model, which is not itself probabilistic. [8] demonstrates a natural cor-
respondence between hidden-variables states and generic objects of the sort
that figure prominently in the foundations of mathematics—a correspondence
with intriguing ontological implications for hidden-variables states.
As explained above, the novelty of the present analysis compared to [4,6] is
that it takes place entirely within the conventional framework of quantum
mechanics, in which physical states are represented by vectors in ordinary
Hilbert space, as opposed to a nonseparable inner-product space in which
there exists an uncountable set of pairwise orthogonal vectors. Cassinello and
Sa´nchez-Go´mez[1] and Caves and Schack[2] have criticized [4], claiming that
it does not succeed in its goal of deriving the probability postulate from prior
quantum principles. We disagree with these authors and present a critique of
their critique in Section 6.
As a practical matter, it will be convenient to employ certain elementary con-
ventions of modern set theory throughout this discussion; these conventions
are summarized in the appendix along with the definitions and basic proper-
ties of partial orders and boolean algebras. Theorems of a general nature are
labeled ‘Proposition’; proofs of these are straightforward or readily available
in the existing literature, but some are nevertheless presented here for their
pedagogic value. Theorems specific to the argument of this paper are labeled
‘Theorem’.
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2 Propositional algebras
Suppose V is a Hilbert space. We use the term proposition to refer to an or-
thogonal projection or to its 1-eigenspace, i.e., its image, according to context.
Any closed subspace P of V is the image of a unique orthogonal projection,
the orthogonal projection to P. We say that propositions P and Q are ortho-
gonal to one another iff they are orthogonal as spaces, i.e., all vectors in P
are orthogonal to all vectors in Q. Regarding propositions as projections, this
is equivalent to imP ⊥ imQ, and this is equivalent to either of the condi-
tions: imQ ⊆ kerP or imP ⊆ kerQ, and therefore to either of the conditions:
PQ = 0 or QP = 0 (‘0’ here denoting the zero operator).
We define the complement ∼P of a proposition P to be P⊥
def
= {φ ∈ V | (∀ψ ∈
P )φ ⊥ ψ}, regarding P as a space, or equivalently, 1 − P , regarding P as
a projection. We say that propositions P and Q commute, PQ, iff they
commute as projections. If PQ we define the meet P ∧Q and join P ∨Q by
P ∧Q = P ∩Q and P ∨Q = span(P ∪Q),
treating P and Q as spaces, where span is the linear span, i.e., closure under
vector addition and scalar multiplication. Note that commuting propositions
correspond to perpendicular spaces, spaces P and Q being perpendicular iff
there exist pairwise orthogonal spaces A, B, and C such that
P ∩ Q = A, P = A⊕ B, and Q = A⊕ C.
⊕ is direct sum, i.e., the linear span of the union of two spaces whose inter-
section is {0} (‘0’ here denoting the zero vector).
Suppose A is a set of commuting propositions closed under the operations of
complementation and meet (equivalently, join). Then A is a boolean algebra
(see Def. 3 in the appendix), specifically a propositional algebra (PA).
Note that if A is a set of commuting propositions and P,Q ∈ A, then 1− P
and PQ commute with all members of A. Thus any set A of commuting
propositions may be closed under complementation and meet to form the
boolean algebra generated by A, which is the smallest propositional algebra
that includes A.
The meet
∧B of a set B of commuting propositions is ⋂{P | P ∈ B}, which, as
the intersection of closed spaces, is closed and is therefore a proposition. Note
that if A is a set of commuting propositions and B ⊆ A, then ∧B commutes
with all members of A. Thus any set A of commuting propositions may be may
be closed under complementation and arbitrary meets (or joins) to form the
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complete propositional algebra generated by A, which is the smallest complete
PA that includes A.
The paradigm of a boolean algebra is the collection S(A) of all subsets of
a given set A. In this algebra meet, join, and complement are respectively
intersection, union, and set-theoretic complement relative to A (∼B = A\B).
A subset of S(A) is a boolean algebra iff it is closed under complementation
and intersection (and hence also union). We will be interested in countably
complete subset algebras, which are closed under countable intersections (and
countable unions).
For the present discussion we are interested in the case A = ω2, the set of
functions from ω to 2, where ω = {0, 1, . . .} and 2 = {0, 1}. 1 For n ∈ ω
and ǫ ∈ 2, let Jnǫ = {f ∈ ω2 | f(n) = ǫ}. The standard topology on ω2 is
defined by taking {Jnǫ | n ∈ ω, ǫ ∈ 2} as a subbase. That is, the open sets are
arbitrary unions of finite intersections of Jnǫ s. The closed sets are those whose
complements are open. The class B of Borel sets is the closure of the class of
open (or closed) sets under the operations of complementation and countable
intersection. B is clearly a countably complete boolean algebra.
A map h : A → C from one boolean algebra into another is a homomorphism
iff it commutes with the complement operation and the binary meet operation
(or, equivalently, the binary join operation). h is countably complete or com-
plete iff it also commutes with countable meets and joins or arbitrary meets
and joins, respectively.
Theorem 1 Suppose Pn, n ∈ ω, are commuting propositions. There exists a
countably complete homomorphism X 7→ P (X) from the boolean algebra B of
Borel subsets of ω2 to the complete PA generated by {Pn | n ∈ ω} such that
for each n ∈ ω,
P (Jnǫ ) =


Pn if ǫ = 1
1− Pn if ǫ = 0.
(2)
PROOF. To extend (2) to a homomorphism on B we could proceed by
repeatedly adjoining complements and countable intersections, defining P (ω2\
X) = ∼P (X) and P (
⋂
n∈ωXn) =
∧
n∈ω P (Xn). To effect this construction
we would have to show that at each intermediate stage, if we have families
{Xn | n ∈ ω} and {Yn | n ∈ ω} such that P (Xn) and P (Yn) are defined for all
1 The use of ‘2’ to denote {0, 1} is standard in set theory when 0, 1, and 2 are
ordinals. For certain purposes it is convenient to identify the ordinals 0 and 1 with
the real numbers with the same names, but in expressions like ‘ω2’, ‘2’ denotes the
set {0, 1}, not the real number 2.
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n ∈ ω, and ⋂n∈ωXn = ⋂n∈ω Yn, then ∧n∈ω P (Xn) = ∧n∈ω P (Yn). This can be
done directly, but it is easier to use the spectral theory of selfadjoint operators
on Hilbert space. 2
Definition 1 For n ∈ ω and σ ∈ n2, i.e., for σ a sequence of 0s and 1s of
length n, define Iσ =
⋂
m<n J
m
σ(m). Thus, Iσ = {f ∈ ω2 | σ ⊆ f}. 3
Let
P (Iσ) =
∏
m<n
P (Jmσ(m)). (3)
Define a map ρ : ω2→ [0, 3/2] by
ρ(f) =
∞∑
n=0
f(n)3−n. (4)
Note that for σ ∈ n2, ρ→Iσ ⊆ Cσ def= [xσ, xσ + 3−n(3/2)], where
xσ =
n−1∑
m=0
σ(m)3−m.
ρ is a homeomorphism of ω2 with the Cantor set formed from [0, 3/2]. (The
Cantor set of a closed interval is obtained by deleting the middle open third
of the interval, then deleting the middle open third of each of the two remain-
ing closed intervals, then deleting the middle open thirds of each of the four
remainders, ad infinitum, and taking the intersection of all of the closed sets
of this sequence.) Let Pλ =
∨{P (Iσ) | σ ∈ <ω2 & ρ→Iσ ⊆ [0, λ]}. Let A be the
selfadjoint operator defined by 4
A
def
=
∫
λ dPλ. (5)
For any Borel function F : [0, 3/2]→ R, the integral ∫ F (λ) dPλ is well defined,
and this is the standard definition of F (A). In particular, suppose X ⊆ ω2 is
2 We are admittedly using an elephant gun to slay a gnat, but it gets the job done.
3 Remember that functions are sets of ordered pairs, so σ ⊆ f iff the finite sequence
σ is an initial segment of the infinite sequence f .
4 Eq. (5) means that for any ψ ∈ V, Aψ is the limit of sums of the form∑n
i=1 λi(Pλi − Pλi−1)ψ, with λ0 < λ1 < · · · < λn, as λ0 → −∞, λn → ∞, and
maxi=1,...,n(λi−λi−1)→ 0, if the limit exists and is otherwise undefined. The spectral
theorem states that the selfadjoint operators are exactly the operators of this form
for monotone increasing OP-valued functions λ 7→ Pλ for which limλ→−∞ Pλ = 0
and limλ→∞ Pλ = 1. Such functions are called projection-valued measures.
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a Borel set. Let FX : [0, 3/2]→ R be the characteristic function of ρ→X, i.e.,
FX(λ) =


1 if ρ−1(λ) ∈ X
0 if ρ−1(λ) /∈ X.
Let
P (X) = FX(A).
P (X) is a selfadjoint operator with spectrum included in {0, 1}, so it is an
orthogonal projection. One easily shows that the map X 7→ P (X) is a homo-
morphism of B with a PA such that (2) holds. Clearly the image of this map
is the complete boolean algebra generated by {Pn | n ∈ ω}. 2
From now on we suppose that 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 is an ω-sequence of commut-
ing propositions, P is the complete PA it generates, and X 7→ P (X) is the
homomorphism of the Borel algebra B to P as given by Theorem 1.
Let ψ ∈ V be an arbitrary nonzero vector. Define
µψ(X) = ‖P (X)ψ‖2. (6)
One readily verifies that µψ is a measure on B, i.e.,
(1) µψ(∅) = 0,
(2) µψ(X) ≥ 0 for all X ∈ B, and
(3) if X =
⋃
n∈ωXn and Xm ∩Xn = ∅ for all m 6= n, then
µψ(X) =
∞∑
n=0
µψ(Xn).
Note that µψ(
ω2) = ‖ψ‖2.
The foregoing situation has the following physical interpretation. A proposi-
tion corresponds to a measurement with two possible outcomes: 0 and 1. We
may paraphrase the measurement corresponding to P as ‘what is the value
of P ?’ or ‘is P 1?’. The projections Pn, n ∈ ω, correspond to simultaneously
answerable questions about a physical state. For any Borel set X ⊆ ω2, P (X)
corresponds to the question ‘is the sequence of values of 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 an
element of X?’.
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3 Probability
Suppose ψ is a normalized statevector and 0 < q < 1. We say that ψ is
q-homogeneous for 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 iff for any n ∈ ω and any σ ∈ n2,
‖P (Iσa〈1〉)ψ‖ = q‖P (Iσ)ψ‖, (7)
If ψ is q-homogeneous then µψ is the q-homogeneous measure µq, which is the
measure on ω2 defined by the condition that
µq(Iσ) =
n−1∏
i=0
qσ(i),
for any n ∈ ω and σ ∈ n2, where
q0 =1− q (8)
q1 = q. (9)
For example, ψ could represent the Heisenberg state of an electron that is sub-
ject to alternating measurements of its spin along two perpendicular axes, Pn
representing the nth observation, in which case q = 1/2. For another example,
if we imagine a system with infinite spatial extent, the Pns could represent
judiciously chosen simultaneous measurements at different places. For a third
example—which does not involve infinite extension in time or space—let ψ be
the state of a point particle uniformly distributed in a box B that extends
along the x-axis from 0 to 1. For n = 0, 1, . . ., and i = 0, 1, let Bni be the
portion of B consisting of points with x-coordinates whose binary expansion
contains i in the nth place. Let Pn consist of determining whether the particle
is in Bn1 . The Pns commute—indeed, they are all functions of the position op-
erator for the x-coordinate—and ψ is 1
2
-homogeneous for this sequence. Each
of these examples is infinitary in its own way—the last in that it contemplates
measurements of arbitarily high precision, but this is intrinsic to the notion of
a continuous observable and is standard in physics; indeed, the simultaneous
performance of all the Pns in this case is simply the measurement of x. The
impossibility of actually performing infinitely many—or infinitely precise—
observations in any effective sense should not be taken to invalidate this line
of reasoning, any more than it invalidates applied probability theory, which in
the final analysis is founded on the notion of an infinite sequence of trials.
Let Lq ⊆ ω2 be defined by the condition
f ∈ Lq ⇐⇒ lim
N→∞
F (N) = q, (10)
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where
F (N)
def
=
1
N
∑
n<N
f(n) (11)
is the frequency statistic.
Proposition 2 Strong law of large numbers
µq(Lq) = 1.
Theorem 3 Thus, if ψ is q-homogeneous then µψ(Lq) = 1, whence, by (6),
P (Lq)ψ = ψ, i.e., ψ is a 1-eigenvector of the observable P (Lq), which repre-
sents the question
1 ‘does the frequency F (N) tend to q as N →∞?’.
Hence the answer to this question, posed of ψ, is ‘yes’.
Note that P (Lq) is in P and commutes with all P ∈ P. Hence
P (Lq)Pψ = PP (Lq)ψ = 0 (12)
for any P ∈ P. For ψ ∈ V, let
[ψ]P
def
= span{Pψ | P ∈ P}, (13)
i.e., the closure of the linear span of the orbit of ψ under the action of P. [ψ]P
is a mode 5 of the system in question and is the smallest mode that contains
ψ and all the states to which it may be projected as a result of observations
in P. (12) gives
Theorem 4 P (Lq) restricted to [ψ]
P is the identity, so the answer to the
question 1 posed of any state in [ψ]P is ‘yes’.
This corresponds to the fact that the first few values in an infinite sequence
of trials (where ‘few’ may refer to any finite number) have no bearing on its
behavior in the limit of infinitely many trials.
5 A mode of a physical system is the set of states corresponding to a closed subspace
of its statevector space.
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4 Tests of randomness
Note that there is nothing probabilistic in the statements of the preceding
section. We are not saying that 1 is usually true or even almost always true, 6
but rather that it is simply true. This is what it means to be an eigenstate
of an observable. Isn’t this a bit strange? Surely there is the possibility that
F (N) 6→ q even though the probability is 0? Not in the quantum worldview,
which is in this way more reasonable than the classical worldview. We will
have more to say on this subject a little later.
So where does probability come in? Probability is just a handy way of talking
about positive measures with maximum value 1. In the preceding example,
we may regard the sequences f ∈ ω2 as arising from the random process Pq
that produces a sequence of 0s and 1s, with the probability of producing a 1
at any step being q. For any X ⊆ ω2, µq(X) is the probability that a sequence
generated by P will be in X. Lq may be regarded as a test of ‘P = Pq’ in the
following sense. Suppose we are presented with a black box that produces a
sequence of 0s and 1s according to some process P. If we used this device to
generate a sequence f : ω → 2 and found that f /∈ Lq, we would be justified
in concluding that the device was not operating according to the process Pq,
i.e., P 6= Pq. Any Borel X ⊆ ω2 with µq(X) = 1 will similarly serve as a test
of the supposition that P = Pq, and P (X) is definitely true of any state in
[ψ]P. This was first observed by Gutmann[6] in the nonseparable situation.
Note that any countable collection of such tests may be applied simultaneously,
because the intersection of any countable collection of sets of measure 1 has
measure 1. Indeed we may imagine a grand test of ‘P = Pq’ that is the
intersection of every imaginable test of this supposition, since there are only
countably many things we can imagine (in truth only finitely many, but let’s
be generous). Let Gq ⊆ ω2 be this set. 7
6 ‘Almost always’ is used in measure theory to refer to sets whose complements
have measure 0, as, for example, the rational numbers have measure 0 as a subset
of the real numbers with the usual Lebesgue measure. In probability theory—which
is just measure theory when the total measure is 1—‘almost always’ means ‘with
probability 1’, as, for example, a real number chosen at random according to a
continuous probability distribution is almost always irrational.
7 The use of imaginability as the criterion for inclusion in Gq is admittedly some-
what facetious. To be more objective we could replace it with definability in some
sense. The objectivity of definability is something of an illusion, which is why we
have emphasized ‘in some sense’: ‘define’ has to be defined. The potential difficulty
is illustrated by Richard’s paradox, which asks ‘what is the smallest natural number
not definable by an English phrase of fewer than sixteen words?’. Since there are
only finitely many English phrases of fewer than sixteen words, there must be such
a number, and there must therefore be a least such. But this number is definable
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Then µq(Gq) = 1, so P (Gq)ψ = ψ, and we see that the question ‘does the
sequence of outcomes of the observations P0, P1, . . ., pass every imaginable
test of ‘P = Pq’?’, posed of ψ, has the definite answer ‘yes’. Thus we may
regard the process of measurement as stochastic.
The preceding example is only a special case of a general phenomenon. Suppose
P = {Pn | n ∈ ω} is an arbitrary family of commuting propositions, P is the
PA it generates, and ψ is an arbitrary statevector. The probability measure
µPψ is in general not of the form µq; rather, the probability that Pn = 1
conditioned on the values of Pm for one or more m 6= n, or more generally
conditioned on the value of Q for any Q ∈ P, is generally dependent on those
values. Nevertheless, as before, we define GPψ to be the intersection of all µ
P
ψ -
measurable T ⊆ ω2 imaginable from P with µPψ(T ) = 1. Let X = GPψ . Then
X serves as the canonical test of µPψ for P as applied to ψ, and the question
‘is the sequence of values of the Pns in X?’, asked of ψ, is definitely answered
in the affirmative.
The generalization of the foregoing analysis to arbitrary processes of obser-
vation (not necessarily binary) in the quantum theory is straightforward. We
therefore conclude that the apparent stochastic nature of observation, with
the squared norm as a probability, is a consequence of the quantum theory
with observation treated like any other interaction, i.e., in the many-worlds
“interpretation”.
Interestingly, this aspect of quantum physics sheds light on one of the singular
conceptual difficulties of probability theory, viz., that in a process like an
infinite sequence of Bernoulli trials, any specific outcome has probability 0,
yet some outcome does occur. Similarly, we may conceive of choosing a real
number according to some continuous probability distribution. Each trial of
this process yields a real number, say x, but the probability of this event, i.e.,
the measure of the set {x}, is 0. Of course, we have learned to live with this;
for example, we understand that it is not appropriate to define an “event” for
a given trial in terms of the result of that trial. Alternatively, we may stipulate
that we will only consider events that are definable in some sense; since there
are only countably many definitions, the union of all definable events with
probability 0 has probability 0, and we can be reasonably comfortable in the
by the phrase
the smallest natural number not definable
by an English phrase of fewer than sixteen words,
which has fifteen words: a contradiction. We return to this paradox in [8, Section
6.1], where we give its resolution as an important limitation on the definability of
‘define’.
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assurance that we will never see a definable event with probability 0 actually
occur.
In the quantum theory, however, the situation is a little different. Each “event”
is associated with a selfadjoint operator, and an event like those just mentioned
corresponds to the 0 operator and simply does not happen. Returning to the
scenario presented at the beginning of this article, recall that in answer to
the question whether, in a large but finite series of observations, the outcome
frequencies might not approximate their expected values, the Copenhagen in-
terpretation says ‘yes, but it’s unlikely’, while the many-worlds interpretation
says ‘yes, and it certainly happens for some version of us’. Let us now consider
the question whether, in an infinite series of observations, it is possible for the
outcome frequencies not to tend to their proper limits. To this the Copenhagen
interpretation says ‘yes, with probability 0’, while the many-worlds interpre-
tation says ‘no, absolutely not’.
5 Absolute continuity of measures
In Theorem 4 we noted that for a q-homogeneous ψ the question P (Lq) is
answered affirmatively not just for ψ but for any ψ′ ∈ [ψ]P, the span of the
orbit of ψ under the action of P. More generally, every ψ′ ∈ [ψ]P passes every
test of µψ, so that the statistical properties represented by these “tests” are
really properties of the mode of the system represented by [ψ]P, not of ψ per
se. Of course, in general ψ′ may pass additional tests with certainty, i.e., µψ′
may have null sets that are not null for µψ. This section is devoted to an
examination of the relation ψ′ ∈ [ψ]P in terms of the measures µψ and µψ′ . It
is not essential to the argument, but is of some interest in its own right.
Suppose M is a nonempty set. A σ-algebra on M is a countably complete
boolean set-algebra of subsets of M (complementation being understood as
relative to M). A measure on a σ-algebra A is a map µ : A → [0,∞] such that
µ(∅) = 0 and for any A0, A1, . . . ∈ A, if Am ∩ An = 0 for all m 6= n, then
µ
(⋃
n∈ω
An
)
=
∑
n∈ω
µ(An).
Note that we allow ∞ as a value of µ, the relevant arithmetic being that
a+∞ =∞ for all a ∈ [0,∞]. µ(M) is obviously the largest value µ can have.
We say that µ is σ-finite iff M is the union of countably many sets of finite
measure; µ is finite iff µ(M) is finite; µ is a unit measure iff µ(M) = 1. If A is
the algebra of Borel subsets of a topological space X (i.e., the closure of the
class of open sets under complementation and countable union), we call µ a
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Borel measure on X . We are particularly interested in the case that M is the
space ω2 of functions from ω to 2—i.e., ω-sequences of zeros and ones—and A
is the Borel algebra B of this space; and we are most particularly interested
in the case of unit Borel measures.
IfM and N are sets with respective σ-algebras M and N then a map f : M →
N is M,N-measurable iff for any X ∈ N, f←X ∈ M. A function f : M → ω2
is M-measurable iff it is M,B-measurable.
Suppose µ is a σ-finite measure on a σ-algebra M on a set M . We define the
integral of a non-negative function as follows. For any f : M → [0,∞), we
define the integral
∫
f dµ by a simple modification of the method of Riemann
sums familiar from calculus: instead of partitioning the domain of f we par-
tition its range, i.e., [0,∞), and define ∫ f dµ as the unique x ∈ R that lies
between the lower sums
∞∑
n=0
xnµ(f
←[xn, xn+1])
and the upper sums
∞∑
n=0
xn+1µ(f
←[xn, xn+1)),
for all 0 = x0 < x1 < · · · such that limn→∞ xn = ∞. Note that the integral
so defined may in general be infinite, although this case will not arise in our
applications. As a rule, the integral with respect to a measure has all the nice
properties of integration appropriate to this general context.
Definition 2 Suppose µ and ν are σ-finite measures on a σ-algebra A on
a set M . ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µ iff for all A ∈ A, if
µ(A) = 0 then ν(A) = 0; otherwise, ν is singular with respect to µ.
Proposition 5 Radon-Nikodym theorem Suppose µ and ν are σ-finite
measures on a σ-algebra M on a set M . ν is absolutely continuous with respect
to µ iff there exists a non-negative M-measurable F : M → R such that for
all X ∈ M, 8
ν(X) =
∫
F (x)χA(x) dµ(x).
8 The variable ‘x’ is inserted here to eliminate the ambiguity of expressions like
‘fg’, which might a priori refer to either x 7→ f(x)g(x), [x, y] 7→ f(x)g(y), or
[x, y] 7→ f(y)g(x).
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Now suppose P = 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence of commuting orthogonal
projections in a Hilbert space V. Let P (·) be the map from the set-algebra
B of Borel subsets of ω2 to the complete projection algebra P generated by
〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 defined in Theorem 1. Note that if F : ω2 → R is Borel we can
define the integral
∫
F (f) dP (f)
in the usual way for projection-valued measures, as is done in the spectral
theory of selfadjoint operators, except that f ranges over ω2 in the present
case, rather than over R. Note that
P (X) =
∫
χX dP.
For each nonzero ψ ∈ V let µψ be the corresponding measure defined by (6),
so that for any Borel X ⊆ ω2
‖P (X)ψ‖2 = µψ(X)‖ψ‖2.
Suppose P ∈ P and let ψ′ = Pψ. Then for any X ∈ B, if µψ(X) = 0, then
P (X)ψ = 0, so
P (X)ψ′ = P (X)Pψ = PP (X)ψ = 0,
so µψ′(X) = 0.
2 In other words, if ψ′ = Pψ, then µψ′ is absolutely continuous with respect
to µψ.
In general, if S is a set of operators on a Hilbert space V, a vector ψ ∈ V is
said to be cyclic for S in V iff V is the closure of the linear span of the orbit
of ψ under the action of the operators in S. In the present case, ψ is cyclic for
P in [ψ]P but not in any larger subspace of V.
Theorem 6 Suppose ψ ∈ V. For any ψ′ ∈ [ψ]P, µψ′ is absolutely continuous
with respect to µψ.
For any unit measure ν on B, if ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µψ
then for some ψ′ ∈ [ψ]P, ν = µψ′.
PROOF. The first statement is a straightforward generalization of 2. To
prove the second assertion suppose X is a Borel subset of ω2. Let χX : ω2 →
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{0, 1} be its characteristic function. Then, as noted above,∫
χX dP = P (X), (14)
whence it follows that for any ψ ∈ V
∥∥∥∥
{∫
χX dP
}
ψ
∥∥∥∥2 =µψ(X)‖ψ‖2 =
(∫
χX dµψ
)
‖ψ‖2 (15)
=
(∫ (
χX
)2
dµψ
)
‖ψ‖2. (16)
The last transformation is a trivial one for characteristic functions, but it
gives the proper form to generalize to an arbitrary non-negative Borel function
G : ω2→ R:∥∥∥∥
{∫
GdP
}
ψ
∥∥∥∥2 =
(∫
G2 dµψ
)
‖ψ‖2, (17)
if either side is well defined (in which case they both are). This is proved by
a straightforward application of limits of sums.
Now suppose ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µψ. Let F :
ω2 → R
be a non-negative Borel function such that for all Borel X ⊆ ω2 9
ν(X) =
∫
F (f)χX(f) dµψ(f), (18)
as guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem. As we have assumed ν is a
unit measure,∫
F dP = 1. (19)
Note also that
√
F is well defined and is non-negative and Borel. Let
ψ′ =
{∫ √
F dP
}
ψ. (20)
Applying (17) and (19) we find that
‖ψ′‖2 = ‖ψ‖2 (21)
9 We use ‘f ’ as the variable of integration as a reminder that the domain of inte-
gration is not R but rather ω2, which consists of functions from ω to 2 (= {0, 1}).
In this context, however, these are best regarded as points, quite analogous to real
numbers.
16
(Bounds relating to this identity may be used to show that the right side of
(20) is actually defined.) Recall that for any Borel X ⊆ ω2,
P (X) =
∫
χX dP.
The following computation is justified by the commutativity of all the pro-
jections involved, and the usual manipulations of integrals in measure theory
(derivable by taking to the limit the corresponding summation identities).
P (X)ψ′=
{∫
χX dP
}{∫ √
F dP
}
ψ (22)
=
{∫ √
F (f)χX(f) dP (f)
}
ψ (23)
Taking the squared norms of both sides and applying (17), noting again that(
χX
)2
= χX since χX is a characteristic function, we obtain
µψ′(X)‖ψ′‖2 =
(∫
F (f)χX(f) dµψ(f)
)
‖ψ‖2.
We now apply (21) to conclude that
µψ′ = ν,
as desired. 2
We continue to suppose that P = 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence of commuting
orthogonal projections in a Hilbert space V and that P (·) is the induced map
from the algebra B of Borel subsets of ω2 to orthogonal projections on V. Let
kerP be the kernel or nullspace of P (·), i.e., the set of Borel sets X ⊆ ω2 for
which P (X) = 0. kerP is a countably complete ideal in B.
3 Clearly, for any Borel X ⊆ ω2, if X ∈ kerP , then µψ(X) = 0 for any
ψ ∈ V; in other words, kerP is included in the null ideal of µψ for every
nonzero ψ ∈ V. Conversely, if X /∈ kerP , then µψ(X) 6= 0 for some ψ ∈ V,
and ψ may be chosen (nonzero) so that P (X)ψ = ψ, so that µψ(X) = 1.
It is easy to construct examples for which kerP is exactly the null ideal of µψ
for some ψ ∈ V: simply let V = [ψ]P. Clearly these are the only examples, i.e.,
the condition ∀P ∈ P (P 6= 0 =⇒ Pψ 6= 0) is equivalent to the condition that
ψ be cyclic for P.
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As far as we know, it is an open question whether this condition is necessarily
satisfied for some ψ ∈ V, but this has little bearing on the issues addressed in
this paper.
6 A critique critiqued
As we noted in the introduction, a version of the preceding analysis was pre-
sented by Farhi et al [4] in the setting of the tensor product V(∞) = V0 ⊗V1 ⊗
· · · of infinitely many Hilbert spaces. Their analysis has been criticized by
Cassinello and Sa´nchez-Go´mez[1] and Caves and Schack[2] as not succeeding
in its goal of deriving the probability postulate from prior quantum principles.
In this section we examine this critique, referring specifically to the presenta-
tion given in [2]. For the purpose of this commentary, in the interest of brevity,
we assume familiarity with [4] and [2].
Following [4], we restrict our attention to the case that V is 2-dimensional. As
noted in the introduction, although V(∞) is a complete inner product space,
it is not separable, and is therefore by definition not a Hilbert space. Indeed,
if we suppose for simplicity that |ψ| = 1, and we let ψ0 = ψ and let ψ1 be any
normalized vector in V orthogonal to ψ, then the vectors of the form
ψj0 ⊗ ψj1 ⊗ · · · , (24)
where 〈j0, j1, . . .〉 is an infinite sequence of 0s and 1s, constitute an orthonormal
basis for V(∞). There are as many such sequences as there are real numbers;
in particular, there are uncountably many. Adapting the notations of [4] and
[2] for ease of reference, we indicate the basis vectors ψ0 = ψ and ψ1 in Vn by
|a, 0〉 and |a, 1〉, respectively, and (24) by |a; {j}〉, a being an arbitrary marker.
(In [2] ψ is used in place of a.)
V(∞) is canonically the direct sum of separable subspaces, the components
of V(∞), which are indeed Hilbert spaces. Let V(∞)c be the component that
contains |a; {0, 0, . . .}〉 = ψ ⊗ ψ ⊗ · · ·. The vectors of the form |a; {i}〉, where
{i} is a sequence of 0s and 1s that contains only finitely many 1s, constitute
an orthonormal basis for V(∞)c . {i} will always be understood to be a sequence
with only finitely many 1s. Note that there are only countably many such
sequences.
Let B be the binary observable on V in which we are interested, and let Bn
be B acting on Vn or on the n
th factor of V(∞):
Bn(ψ0 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ · · ·) = ψ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψn−1 ⊗ Bψn ⊗ ψn+1 · · · .
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In the latter sense Bn corresponds to Pn as used in the preceding sections.
Let |b, 0〉 and |b, 1〉 be normalized 0- and 1-eigenvectors of B, respectively. Let
p0 = |〈a, 0|b, 0〉|2 and p1 = |〈a, 0|b, 1〉|2 = |〈ψ|b, 1〉|2 = |Bψ|2 (so that p1 is
our q). For infinite sequences {j} = 〈j0, j1, . . .〉 of 0s and 1s, let |b; {j}〉 be a
simultaneous eigenvector of all the Bns with Bn|b; {j}〉 = jn|b; {j}〉. Note that
|b; {j}〉 is only defined up to a nonzero scalar factor. As shown in [4], |b; {j}〉
is not normalizable.
We express the |a; {i}〉s in terms of the |b; {j}〉s by
〈a; {i}|Ψ〉 =
∫
dµ({j}) 〈a; {i}|b; {j}〉〈b; {j}|Ψ〉, (25)
where Ψ is arbitrary, and the integration is over all sequences {j} according to
a measure µ, which essentially determines the normalization of |b; {j}〉. This
is (TII) on p. 374 of [4].
|b; {j}〉 has up to this point only been defined up to a scalar factor, and in [4]
this arbitrariness is eliminated (in the parenthesis following (TI)) by setting
〈a; {0}|b; {j}〉 = 1. (26)
(Here {0} is the sequence 〈0, 0, . . .〉. In [2], |a; {0}〉 is called |{ψ}〉.) With this
convention we have (TI) of [4]:
〈a; {i}|b; {j}〉 =
∞∏
n=0
〈a, in|b, jn〉
〈a, 0|b, jn〉 , (27)
and this of course uniquely determines µ, which is shown in [4] to be the p1-
homogeneous measure, which we would call µp1, i.e., the unit measure that
assigns independent weights p0, p1 to jn = 0, 1.
[1] and [2] take exception to this argument, noting that the identification of
µp1 as the measure in (25) depends on the choice (26), which is not mandated
by any consideration other than the desire to obtain µp1. [2] considers the
consequences of omitting this step and defines a function {j} 7→ c{ψ}({j}) by
〈a; {0}|b; {j}〉 = c{ψ}({j}).
The measure µ of (25) is then
dµ({j}) = |c{ψ}({j})|2dµp1({j}), (28)
which, as pointed out in [2], is rather arbitrary. We note, however, that this
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µ is absolutely continuous with respect to µp1, i.e., any set of {j}s with µp1-
measure 0 has µ-measure 0. (We assume that |c{ψ}|2 is a measurable function,
which is necessary in order that the discussion make sense.)
The error in [1,2] lies in supposing that the argument of [4] depends on µ = µp1.
In fact it does not. The crux of the argument in [4] comes in the next section,
where the frequency operator F corresponding to B is defined by
F |b; {j}〉 = f({j})|b; {j}〉,
where
f({j}) = 1
2
(
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
jn + lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
jn
)
.
The idea here is that f({j}) is defined for all {j}, and if limN→∞ 1N
∑N−1
n=0 jn
exists then f({j}) has that value.
By the strong law of large numbers, for a set of sequences {j} with µp1-
measure 1, the limit does exist and is p1. It follows that the same is true
for any measure absolutely continuous with respect to µp1, in particular for
the measure µ defined by (28), which appears in (25) if we do not normalize
according to (26). Hence
F |Ψ〉 = p1|Ψ〉
for any Ψ ∈ V(∞)c , in particular for |a; {0}〉 = ψ ⊗ ψ ⊗ · · ·, which is the state
of interest. In other words, a measurement of the proportion of ns for which
the value of Bn is 1 certainly yields p1.
The same argument applies generally, and all states in V(∞)c certainly pass all
tests of randomness. Thus the probability postulate does indeed follow from
prior quantum principles in this setting, just as it does in the conventional
setting as shown in Sections 3 and 4.
Before moving on, we remark that our discussion at the end of Section 4 is
pertinent to Section 4.1 of [2], entitled ”Certainty versus probability 1”. The
quantum theoretical representation of observables as operators on a (separa-
ble) Hilbert space actually does make “certainty” equivalent to “probability
1”. Essentially, quantum observables in the usual sense do not possess suffi-
cient discriminatory power to distinguish these notions.
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Appendix
∅ is the empty set, i.e., the (unique) set with no members. We also use ‘0’ to
denote ∅. 1 is defined as {0}, 2 is {0, 1}, 3 is {0, 1, 2}, etc. In other words, the
natural numbers are defined in such a way that each natural number n is the
set of numbers that precede it (of which there are n). These are also referred
to as the finite ordinals. ω
def
= {0, 1, . . .} is the set of all finite ordinals.
We regard a function as a set of ordered pairs, so that f = {[x, f(x)] | x ∈
dom f}. dom f , the domain of f , is the set of first elements of pairs in f
and im f , the image of f , is the set of second elements of pairs in f . We
also represent f by 〈f(x) | x ∈ dom f〉. For n ∈ ω, a sequence of length
n or n-sequence or n-tuple is a function with domain n. In the notation just
introduced, if σ is an n-sequence then σ = 〈σ(m) | m ∈ n〉. We may also denote
such a sequence σ by indicating its elements as an explicit list between angle
brackets. Thus σ = 〈σ(0), σ(1), . . . , σ(n− 1)〉. Similarly, an ω-sequence—also
called an infinite sequence—is a function with domain ω, and we may indicate
such a sequence σ by ‘〈σ(0), σ(1), . . .〉’. Concatenation of finite sequences is
defined and indicated as follows: σaσ′ = 〈σ(0), . . . , σ(n− 1), σ′(0), . . . , σ′(n′−
1)〉, where σ and σ′ have length n and n′, respectively.
If f is a function and X is a set,
f↿X
def
= {[x, f(x)] | x ∈ X ∩ dom f}
f→X
def
= {y | (∃x ∈ X ∩ dom f)f(x) = y}
f←X
def
= {y ∈ dom f | f(y) ∈ X}.
If A and B are sets we define AB (read “B pre A”) to be the set of all functions
from A to B. In particular, for n ∈ ω, nB is the set of functions from n into
B, i.e., the set of n-tuples from B, and ωB is the set of all infinite sequences
from B. We define <ωB to be
⋃
n∈ω
nB.
Definition 3 A boolean algebra is a structure A = (|A|,∼,∨,∧, 1, 0) with the
following properties:
(1) 0 6= 1.
(2) For all P,Q,R ∈ |A|
P ∨ P = P, P ∧ P = P,
P ∨Q = Q ∨ P, P ∧Q = Q ∧ P,
P ∨ (Q ∨ R) = (P ∨Q) ∨ R,
P ∧ (Q ∧ R) = (P ∧Q) ∧ R,
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(P ∨Q) ∧ R = (P ∧ R) ∨ (Q ∧ R),
(P ∧Q) ∨ R = (P ∨ R) ∧ (Q ∨ R).
(3) For each P ∈ |A|, ∼P is the unique element of |A| such that
P ∨∼P = 1 and P ∧∼P = 0.
(4) For all P,Q ∈ |A|
∼(P ∨Q) = ∼P ∧∼Q and ∼(P ∧Q) = ∼P ∨∼Q.
We write ‘P −Q’ for ‘P ∧ (∼Q)’.
The order relation for A is defined by
P ≤ Q ⇐⇒ P = P ∧Q,
or, equivalently, P ≤ Q ⇐⇒ Q = P ∨ Q. P ∧ Q is therefore the greatest
lower bound and P ∨Q the least upper bound of {P,Q}.
A boolean algebra A is complete iff if every subset of A has a greatest lower
bound, which we call the meet of the set. Every set in a complete boolean
algebra also has a least upper bound, which we call the join of the set. A is
countably complete iff every countable set of elements has a meet (equivalently,
a join) in A.
Elements of a boolean algebra A are compatible iff their meet is nonzero. A has
the countable chain condition iff every set of pairwise incompatible elements
is countable.
Proposition 7 If a boolean algebra A is countably complete and satisfies the
countable chain condition then A is complete.
PROOF. The proof depends on the axiom of choice. On this assumption any
set can be put in one-one correspondence with a von Neumann cardinal, i.e.,
an ordinal κ such that there does not exist a function from any ordinal λ < κ
onto κ. We proceed by induction. Suppose joins exist for all sets of cardinality
less than κ, where κ is a cardinal, and suppose X = {xα | α ∈ κ} is a subset
of A. Let yα =
∨{xβ | β ∈ α} for each α ∈ κ. The elements xα − yα, α ∈ κ,
are pairwise incompatible, so by the countable chain condition, only countably
many of them are nonzero, so the join of the corresponding yαs exists. This is
clearly the least upper bound of X. 2
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